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These brief remarks focus on the concepts of intent and
recklessness in tort and how a Restatement should approach them.
They center on three jurisprudential issues that are raised in any
discussion of the basic building block concepts of a body of law,
namely, the role of interpretive construction in the application of
such concepts, the value of systemic consistency between such con-
cepts and similar ones in other bodies of law, and, finally, the need
to determine which concepts are criterial and which are merely evi-
dential. They reflect my commentaries as a member of the panel on
intent at the John W. Wade Conference on the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: General Principles. The charge of the panel, which in-
cluded George Fletcher and Anthony Sebok, was to reflect critically
on the draft of an essay by Professors Henderson and Twerski enti-
tled Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restat-
ing Law. Their thoughtful essay made a host of theoretical and
practical claims, two of which I dispute below. I conclude with a
comment on the proper conceptualization of recklessness.




Henderson and Twerski argue that proper conceptualization
of the intent requirement requires recognition of a distinction be-
tween "the proximate consequences of discrete acts, on the one
hand, and the inevitable consequences of general courses of con-
duct, on the other."' They contend that the concept of "intended
consequences" should not be applied to a course of repetitious con-
duct-such as batting in the lineup on a major league baseball club
throughout a long season-undertaken by an actor, because over
the course of such conduct "some types of unhappy consequences
are, sooner or later, virtually certain to occur."2
For a batter in the major leagues, hitting foul balls into the stands, thereby strik-
ing patrons, is certain to occur from time to time across many thousands of swings
of a bat. Yet in connection with any given swing, not only does the batter not do-
sire to hit a foul ball when he swings the bat, he does not believe that such a con-
sequence is certain-or even very likely-to follow. The player understands at the
outset of the baseball season that foul balls will inevitably occur; but the "act" re-
ferred to in the phrase "one intends the consequence of an act" is the discrete act of
swinging a bat at a pitched ball, not the deliberate undertaking of the course of
conduct involved in batting regularly in a major-league lineup. Properly conceptu-
alized, intent focuses on discrete acts, not general courses of conduct.3
Recognition of such a distinction would undermine a signifi-
cant non-instrumentalist or fairness rationale supporting strict li-
ability for manufacturing defects in the area of products liability. A
manufacturer of large quantities of products intended for mass con-
sumption in a mass market "knows with substantial certainty" (in
other words, "intends") that some percentage of those products will
contain manufacturing defects that pose safety risks. No quality
control process is infallible. The defect rate for any given manufac-
turing process will typically vary according to how many resources
are invested in quality control. Once the manufacturer concludes
that it has invested "reasonable" resources in quality control, it will
take no further steps to prevent defects even though it knows re-
sidual defects remain. It can predict the number of accidents and
accident victims that will stem from the residual defects that even
reasonable quality control processes cannot prevent. In a word, the
manufacturer is like an actor who shoots into a crowd. As
Henderson rightly points out:
1. James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The
Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1141-42 (internal citations omitted).
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The producer, like the shooter, does not know who will be injured; but as surely as
the shooter knows that someone will be shot, the producer knows that someone
will be injured .... The shooter loads his gun with a certain number of bullets,
and the producer accepts a certain defect rate when setting the level of quality
control for its products .... Choosing to limit quality control means accepting a
certain number of accidents; so in a sense, the eventual victims of this choice are
harmed deliberately.4
Of course, unlike the shooter, the producer who invests adequate
resources in quality control can be said to be behaving reasonably
and hence not liable under a negligence regime for harms caused by
the residual defects.5 Nevertheless, in the famous landmark case of
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., an actor who intentionally
harms others is liable even when the actor is privileged to act, that
is to say, even when the actor has acted reasonably and has not
committed a trespass in deliberately taking the welfare of another.6
"The best that can be said for the manufacturer is that it has be-
haved in a economically rational manner; but that does not alter
the fact that its deliberate decision has condemned users and con-
sumers to suffer harm."7 Fairness, therefore, may require that he
compensate his victims. 8
The authors seek to avoid this train of thought by crafting
the "proximate consequences of discrete acts" versus "inevitable
consequences of general courses of conduct" distinction. This dis-
tinction works, however, only to the extent that we accept their in-
terpretive construction of the facts. Interpretive construction is a
process by which we decide to characterize facts either broadly or
narrowly, at a high level of generality or with particularity, within
a broad or narrow time frame, etc.9 Regardless of the substantive
legal standard, interpretive construction of the facts can make a
case seem very hard or very easy, and determine the outcome of the
case. In proximate cause, for instance, the substantive legal crite-
rion may be foreseeability, but how one interpretively constructs
the facts may really be the decisive issue. Thus, in Hines v. Morrow,
the defendant negligently permitted a railroad crossing to become
full of pot holes. 10 A car became mired in the mud at the crossing.
4. James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REV. 919, 937 (1981).
5. Id.
6. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910).
7. Henderson, supra note 4, at 937.
8. Id.
9. For a thoughtful general discussion of the phenomenon of interpretive construction in
the criminal law setting, see Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantiv'e Crimi.
nal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981).
10. Hines v. Morrow, 236 S.W. 183, 184 (cex. Civ. App. 1921).
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The plaintiff, who had one wooden leg, went to the crossing to lend
a hand in removing the car." A truck was bought up, and the plain-
tiff went between the car and the truck to tie a rope to each.' 2 When
the truck started to back up, the plaintiff attempted to step out
from between the two vehicles, but found that he could not because
his wooden leg had sunk into a mud hole.'3 A coil from the tow rope
caught the plaintiffs good leg, causing it such serious injury that it
had to be amputated below the knee. 14 On appeal, the defendant
argued that the condition of the crossing was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury. 15
A finding of proximate cause in this case hangs as much on
interpretive construction of the facts as on the substantive test for
proximate cause. As Professor Morris has pointed out, had the court
focused on the details of the events, the defendant might have pre-
vailed.' 6 Instead, the court adopted a broader interpretive focus in
line with the plaintiffs description of the facts:
The case, stated in the briefest form, is simply this: [Plaintiff] was on the highway,
using it in a lawful manner, and slipped into this hole, created by [defendant's]
negligence, and was injured in undertaking to extricate himself .... [To the de.
fendant's argument that it] could not reasonably have been foreseen that slipping
into this hole would have caused the [plaintiff] to have become entangled in a rope,
and the moving truck, with such dire results ... [the] answer is plain: The exact
consequences do not have to be foreseen. 7
This kind of interpretive legerdemain lies behind the intui-
tive appeal of the authors' foul ball analogy. A counter-analogy
could be a shooter who fires not a single shot from a single action
rifle into a crowd, but one who, armed with an automatic AK-47
with a long ammunition belt, takes aim at a crowd. Imagine that
the ammunition belt he feeds the AK-47 contains a hundred ran-
domly selected rounds, ninety-nine of which are blanks and only
one of which is "live." If we interpretively construct the facts by
narrowing the time frame to each discrete shot and disjoining (or
disaggregating) each shot from its predecessor and successor, we
might conclude that he did not "intend" or "know with substantial
certainty" that he would injure anyone in the crowd. Indeed, we can






16. Clarence Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REv. 185, 193 (1950).
17. Hines, 236 S.W. at 187-88.
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timer and abandons it, so that it only fires one round from the am-
munition belt per day or week, resulting in great temporal distance
between the discrete acts. Nevertheless, our intuitions would de-
mand that he be responsible for an intentional injury when the
"live" round is finally discharged into the crowd. Engaging in duel-
ing analogies, however, is not the proper way to resolve a question,
like this, that turns on interpretive construction. Rather, the focus
should be on the background propositions (specifically, the norma-
tive commitments and factual assumptions) that motivate us to
broadly or narrowly construct the facts.
II. SYSTEMIC CONSISTENCY
Professors Henderson and Twerski also contend that a gen-
eral requirement of a Tort Restatement concept or definition is that
it "must be kept endogenous to tort" without regard for how the
concept or definition is conceptualized in legal contexts other than
tort. 8 They specifically say that the fact that "intent" has a certain
meaning in the criminal law should be quite irrelevant to our
thinking about tort law since a Restatement of Torts speaks only to,
and need only concern itself with, the tort system of which it is a
constituent part.19
Such a perspective ignores the value of systemic
consistency 20 among all the rules that make up the body of the law;
that is, rules and principles across different areas of law should be
consistent with one another. Systemic consistency does not require
that concepts and definitions in different areas of law always be
treated identically. When we require consistency in everyday activi-
ties, we usually mean that any differences in the treatment of two
cases must be justified by some relevant background propositions.
The same is true in common law reasoning, and here the relevant
background propositions consist chiefly of applicable moral norms,
social policies, and empirical propositions about the way the world
works.
For example, consider the concepts and definitions that
make up self-defense doctrine. As between criminal law and torts,
these concepts and definitions are largely coextensive. Indeed,
when he examines the privilege of self-defense in his own excellent
Torts casebook, Henderson has included and still includes relevant
references to criminal law self-defense cases involving battered
18. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1136.
19. Id.
20. MELVIN ARON EISENBERO, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 44 (1988).
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women. 21 This is appropriate because there are no moral norms,
social policies, or empirical propositions that justify any difference
in the treatment of self-defense concepts in tort as against criminal
law. For the same reason, Henderson extensively examines the
criminal law case of People v. Collins22 in the chapter in his Torts
casebook on actual causation and statistical proofs. 23 Of course, if
there are relevant background propositions that justify treating
ostensibly similar concepts in different doctrinal areas differently,
by all means they should receive different treatment, but only after
explicitly adverting to the reasons of morality, policy, or experience
that justify the difference. That way, the values promoted by sys-
temic consistency may be fully vindicated. These values include
predictability, evenhandedness, harmonizing legal outcomes with
the expectations of private citizens, and furthering the legitimacy of
the law by demonstrating its substantive and formal rationality.
III. RECKLESSNESS
My chief concern with the concept of recklessness is that it
should not turn on a requirement of conscious risk-taking. Reck-
lessness may be viewed as having a cognitive component (aware-
ness of risk-taking) and a dispositional component (indifference-
or callous indifference-to the interests of others). What can be
easily overlooked is that these two components may not always be
in harmony; indeed, in a given actor, the dispositional component
may negate the formation of the cognitive component. That is, an
actor may be so callously indifferent to the interests of others that
it never consciously crosses his mind that his behavior poses risks
of injury to them. An actor should not escape liability for reckless-
ness simply because he failed to care enough (his dispositional de-
fect) to notice the obvious risk to life (or other weighty social inter-
ests) created by his conduct. Liability for recklessness should ex-
tend to actors who are callously indifferent to the interests of oth-
ers, whether that indifference is manifested in their conscious risk-
taking or in their very failure to notice risks they are creating.
Viewed in this way, the cognitive component of recklessness (con-
scious risk-taking) is not criterial (a necessary element) but merely
evidential. The dispositional component (callous indifference), how-
ever, does play a criterial role in the sense of being the necessary
21. JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 82 (4th ed. 1994).
22. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
23. JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 106-08 (5th ed. 1999).
1162 [Vol. 54:3:1157
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(and in this case sufficient) condition of liability for recklessness.
Conscious risk-taking may be probative evidence of callous indiffer-
ence, but an action for recklessness should lie even if the actor's
dispositional defect renders him oblivious to the safety of others.

